Now one further complication: people in many countries, including the United Kingdom, have come to regard trade unions as selfish and irresponsible and their political allies -Labour and Social Democratic parties -as well past their sell-by date. Anyone who harbours such a view of the political and industrial wings of the labour movement is likely to balk at inscribing labour rights in the lexicon of human rights. And to make matters even more difficult, such views are sometimes held by members of groups that were historically excluded from labour markets or relegated to their margins, but now invoke human rights laws to vindicate their rights against both employers and unions. At the very least, one might say, establishing the affinity of human rights and labour rights is both a conceptual and a political challenge.
Nonetheless, the discourse of labour rights has swung sharply in the direction of human rights. Why? For negative reasons and positive ones as well. The negative reasons are these: workers no longer identify themselves as producers but as consumers; labour has therefore lost its raison d'etre as a class-based economic and political movement. Moreover, changes in labour markets and modes of production have also robbed it of much of its former economic power, while globalization has made its national focus increasingly anachronistic. As a consequence of these and other developments, workers in most advanced democracies confront greater individual insecurity and loss of collective agency than they have in decades. Hence the shift of labour advocacy in the direction of human rights. Aligning itself with the cause of human rights will (it is hoped) broaden the base of the labour movement and rebuild its alliance with other progressive forces; engaging with the discourse of human rights will renew its intellectual energy and refresh its message; and adopting the legal and constitutional strategies of its sister movement will enable labour to secure solid protections for workers comparable to those that human rights advocates have won for all citizens over the past half-century.
What will this mean in practice? Human rights movements are deeply committed to constitutionalism.
On the one hand, we have seen the adoption of a number of impressive constitutional texts including conventions and charters on human rights adopted by the UN, the EU and other trans-national regimes, as well as the Canadian
Charter of 1982 and the UK Human Rights Act of 1998. On the other, there has been a great surge of legislation, implementing these constitutional texts and a spectacular outburst of litigation by citizens asserting and vindicating their rights. If workers' rights -to organize, to bargain, to strike, to receive a living wage, to enjoy decent working conditions, to have a voice in workplace decisions, to be treated with respectif all of these rights were reconceived as human rights, they too could be constitutionalized; and they too would be robustly protected. That at least is the hope.
So in answer to the question "why am I here": I am here to examine this turn in the discourse of labour law.
II THE RIGHTS-BASED LITIGATION-DRIVEN JURIDICAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
To restate: the great ambition of labour rights advocates today is that workers' rights should also be constitutionalized: that they should be entrenched in the country's basic law; that no law should be able to derogate from them; and that they should be justiciable: workers denied their rights should be able to secure legal redress. The results would be transformative (these advocates argue); the costs would be minimal; the world would be a better place.
This rights-based, litigation-driven juridical model of constitutionalism is not the only one on offer; I will mention several alternatives shortly. However it is a model that beguiles labour advocates, as it does many progressive thinkers and legal scholars who believe in the transformative potential of law. They imagine that litigating constitution rights will somehow succeed in balancing capitalism's equation of unequal power, ensure social justice and put material flesh on the dry, legal bones of the liberal-democratic state. And now I have to admit, if you haven't already guessed:
I am an advocate of labour rights; I am a progressive; and (I hope) I am a scholar: but I
am not beguiled.
The rights-based, litigation-driven juridical model of constitutionalism is found in its purest form in America, whose fundamental law guarantees freedom of association, assembly, expression and procedural due process. These guarantees might, in principle, have been interpreted as protecting the right of workers to join unions, engage in industrial action, and be dismissed only on notice and for cause. But of course they were not. The result -advocates of constitutionalization claim -is that in America union membership in the private sector has fallen to about 8% -its lowest level in 100 years; that strikes are an endangered species; and that workers are still presumed to be employed "at will" and subject to dismissal without notice or recourse.
All of this is true, but does it follow that if labour's rights under the constitution had been acknowledged and protected, the lot of American workers would be better than it is?
Let's look at some international comparisons. interests, and to be protected against legislative attempts to restrict those rights or to override collectively bargained agreements. The courts have also ruled that the industrial torts and the common law of wrongful dismissal must be reconfigured to accord with Charter principles. Is this not proof-positive that constitutionalization of workers' rights will revive labour's flagging fortunes?
Time will tell, but my own prediction is that -the Charter notwithstanding -ten or twenty years from now, Canadian union membership and power will have declined not grown; that Canadian workers will enjoy lower, not higher, wages; that their jobs will be more, not less, precarious; and that the social safety net that protects them against the vicissitudes of the labour market will have fewer strands and more holes. If I'm right, if the Charter fails to protect labour rights in the real world, I now add, it will be true to form: all the available empirical evidence suggests that its potential to bring about social transformation in other domains -including human rights -has been greatly over-estimated.
How can this be? Rights-based constitutional litigation ought in principle to be the most efficacious way to ensure that employment relations are fair in both a substantive and procedural sense.
Alas, in practice litigation is unlikely to alter the deep structures of society and economy that relegate workers to a subordinate role in their relations with employers.
There are many reasons why this is so:
 because constitutions typically limit state -not private, corporate -power;
 because labour rights are necessarily couched in general language that can easily be read down;
 because judges often comprehend labour rights less well and value them less highly than those of other interest groups;
 because litigation is expensive, slow and often inaccessible to individual workers or their representatives;
 because evidentiary and procedural rules generally make constitutional litigation unsuitable for the resolution of open-ended conflicts of social interests;
 because remedies that might fundamentally transform labour's situation would require a redistribution of wealth and power that courts lack the capacity to design, a mandate to initiate or the means to implement;
 and because by pursuing their recourse within the existing constitutional framework, workers would be implicitly agreeing to abstain from using their economic and political power in ways that would radically alter that framework -a Faustian bargain they might well come to regret.
III ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
However, as I mentioned earlier, the rights-based litigation-driven juridical model of a constitution is not the only one available. Many states -in both the global North and the global South -have dealt with labour rights in their constitutions, often in language that is merely symbolic or evocative rather than tightly prescriptive. However, some of these constitutions specify that legislation should be enacted to regulate employment relations, that the state should strive to achieve just labour market outcomes, or that employers and workers should collaborate in the management of enterprises. But oddly, while these states have "constitutionalized" labour rights in similar ways, they seem to end up adopting very different laws and policies, constructing very different labour market institutions and achieving very different degrees of industrial peace, social justice and national prosperity. In fact, one is struck by the total disjuncture between the constitutional model adopted to protect labour rights, on the one hand, and actual workplace and labour market outcomes on the other. Rather, outcomes seem almost wholly attributable to other factors: national demographies and endowments, national histories and cultures, and above all, the forces of national and international political economy.
I want to say a word specifically about the United Kingdom which, as you know, exemplifies a unique model of constitutionalism. Traditionally the British "constitution"
was understood merely as "that which constitutes" the polity. It comprises a miscellany of charters and declarations, statutes and common law rules, invented traditions and unwritten conventions that define the composition and functions of Parliament, the judiciary, the executive and the Crown, as well as relations amongst them and with citizens. Litigation was at best marginal to this constitutional model. In this sense, it was a political constitution, rather than a juridical one. Moreover, its effects on labour rights were, at best, indirect. But though quintessentially "British" -in the sense that it was unwritten, organic, imprecise, and non-justiciable -Kahn Freund's laissez faire version of the "economic constitution" ultimately gave way to the dense regime of substantive and procedural law that now regulates British workplaces. Like the political constitution, the economic constitution of the United Kingdom is today in part inspired and mandated by Europe;
but it is also driven by changes in British politics, society, law and economic life, and by perceived or desired shifts in the balance of power in British labour markets. Alas, after a half century of intense encounters with these more explicit forms of constitutionalization, many British workers are worse off, in a relative sense, than they were when Kahn Freund's idea of an economic constitution was ascendant. Alas it isn't sufficient that that labour rights are in some way "constitutionalized": what counts is the content of those rights, the institutions and processes through which they are protected, and especially the political economy in which they are meant to be realized.
Once again, I want to make brief mention of Canada. Our political and economic constitutions do not mention "labour" specifically. However, in assigning jurisdiction over labour matters to the provinces rather than to the federal government, the courts relied on constitutional language that gave the provinces the right to legislate concerning "matters of a merely local and private nature" and those involving "civil [that is, contractual] rights". This characterization of labour matters has had important practical effects: it forestalled the emergence of national labour standards and labour market institutions; it prevented the federal government from implementing international labour standards without provincial consent; and it helped to dissolve the national labour movement into a dozen relatively weak and sometimes warring provincial movements. But its greatest effects have been symbolic: if labour rights involve "merely local" or "private" or contractual issues, how can they be regarded as issues that fundamentally divide the polity, give rise to debates over the maldistribution of wealth and power, or engage the soaring rhetoric of the Charter. In other words, Canada's political and economic constitutions contradict its juridical constitution, the Charter. Next, I want to say a word about the "constitution of the enterprise". A good deal of research and debate in recent years has focussed on how workers are integrated (or not) into the governance of the enterprise. Here I'll make special reference to North
American experience which admittedly lags far behind the experience of many European countries which, in turn, lags far behind the ideal-type of worker participation that is supposed to prevail in those countries.
In North America, we have seen four models of enterprise constitutions, four experiments in enterprise governance that were all ostensibly designed to protect workers' interests:
 the collective bargaining model which attempted to endow "citizens at work" with formal rights of association, voice and due process analogous to those they enjoy in the broader society;
 the "stakeholder" model which mandated management decision-makers to address the best interests not only of shareholders but also of workers, customers, suppliers and others foreseeably affected by corporate action;
 the "human capital" model whose rationale of enlightened self-interest was meant to persuade employers to treat workers as valuable assets worthy of investment in the form of good working conditions, benefits, amenities, training and, especially, trust; and  the "worker capitalist" model which reminded workers that their pension and other benefit funds made them significant members of the shareholding class, with a stake in the success of predatory capitalism.
As things turned out, all four of these North American experiments in "constitutionalizing" labour's role in workplace governance failed. They did so in part because they sought to reform workplace governance without taking into account the aggressive form of liberal market capitalism that prevails in North America, and in part because they neither acknowledged nor addressed the internal political economy of the enterprise itself. The constitution of the enterprise, it turns out, cannot be reformed in isolation from the juridical, political and economic constitutions of the state. Or in another formulation: varieties of capitalism give rise to varieties of workplace constitutions, not vice versa.
IV CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE
Capitalism, however, operates not only within but across national borders. Deep regional economic integration has been achieved in Europe; North America has gone some way down that path; and regional trade regimes have begun to emerge in South America, Asia and Africa. The question is: will it be possible to entrench labour rights in whatever passes for the constitutions of these regional regimes?
Based on the European experience, one should not be too optimistic. Even the EU, which leads the world in this respect, has been oddly diffident about entrenching collective labour rights in its "constitution". NAFTA has been even more diffident, though it has adopted a so-called side-agreement, the North American Accord on Labour Cooperation, whose protection for labour rights can most charitably be described as "minimalist". And so far as I know, none of the other regional trade regimes has come close to entrenching labour rights, except in a nominal sense. It is hardly surprising, then, that the WTO with its global, rather than regional, mandate has resolutely resisted making compliance with labour rights a condition of doing business in the world economy. I mention these promising developments -in today's vernacular, "green shoots" -in order to suggest that perhaps constitutions are sometimes created from the bottom up rather than the top down, that they may result from an accidental concatenation of unrelated events rather that from the deliberations of august assemblies, that they may be shaped by practical struggles in particular domains rather than by the comprehensive designs of legal architects.
V CONCLUSION
I have framed this last observation as a commentary on the constitutionalization of labour rights in the global economy. But now, in conclusion, I will suggest that it applies as well to domestic constitutions. I return to my earlier juxtaposition of formal juridical constitutions and political, economic and enterprise constitutions.
Clearly states can adopt juridical constitutions; they can entrench labour rights; they can make those rights justiciable; they can authorize citizens to sue to defend their rights; and they can authorize the courts to award them remedies. In fact, this sort of constitutionalization proceeds at a manic pace: since 1789 national constitutions have had a median life span of 17 years, and an average life span of less than half
that. But what does this sort of constitutionalization signify? Do we really imagine that each new constitution brings fundamental change to the state that adopts it? that rights made justiciable thereby become effective in the real world? that citizens and workers) endowed with those rights will actually be empowered? that courts that acquire remedial powers can and will attempt to use them to realign the deep structures of economy and polity? and that if they do so, they will succeed in transforming global capitalism and making the world safer for workers?
I have asked what appear to be four distinct questions, but are all really variations on a single theme: scepticism about rights-based, litigation-driven juridical models of constitutionalism. I conclude by offering in place of scepticism four hypotheses that are, in my view, entirely plausible:
 the constitution that counts is the "real" constitution that expresses, normalizes, legitimates and therefore reinforces actual-existing relations of power;
 in the event of conflict, the "real" constitution will prevail over juridical constitutions;
 strategies designed to produce significant change though constitutional litigation will prove to be disappointing for labour advocates and, in the long run, for human rights advocates as well; and  workers with an inclination and capacity for collective action will find a way to vindicate their "rights" whatever the juridical constitution might say or however the courts might rule.
I hypothesize, therefore I am.
